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ABSTRACT
Political Cooperation and International Environmental Governance in the Baltic Sea
Region after World War II
Taavi Kelder

Today, global environmental problems have become one of the most important international
issues. This Master’s thesis is about international environmental and political cooperation in the
Baltic Sea Region after World War II. The Baltic Sea is surrounded by nine states and the
degradation of the marine environment of the Baltic Sea has become a common problem.
However, international environmental cooperation depends on many political factors: financial
support, international organizations, the attitude of states, international law and the status of
environmental issues in the international arena. This thesis focuses on different forms of political
cooperation which have influenced international environmental governance in the Baltic Sea
area. These forms of political cooperation include that of the Cold War political situation, despite
the division between the East and the West, increased cooperation after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, the Helsinki Commission and the European Union. International environmental
cooperation needs an appropriate political environment where states around a sea have incentives
and will to protect the environment. The Baltic Sea is a good example of international
governance of a maritime environment.
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INTRODUCTION

The political map of the world where we live today is not composed only of nation-states dealing
with their narrow national interests. The world has become much more global and international
in political, environmental (global warming, maritime pollution) and economic terms. There are
also regions where states in the same area, on the same coast or around the same sea have similar
environmental problems. Geography and belonging to a certain region, international organization
or environmental regime forces states to act in certain ways. However, there are different factors
which influence cooperation among states in the region or regime: for example, the political
situation, different economies or an unequal level of political development.
This Master’s thesis is about political cooperation and international environmental
governance in the Baltic Sea Region after World War II. Why is this subject important? Most of
all, the Baltic Sea Region is a unique one. The Baltic Sea marine environment is an extremely
sensitive, fragile and vulnerable ecosystem as the sea is a shallow, enclosed and brackish water
basin. At the same time, the Baltic Sea is under severe stress from pollution and human
activities, including industries and shipping. There were serious signs of the environmental
degradation of the Baltic Sea already at the end of the 1960s.
On the other hand, the Baltic Sea is fragmented politically: there are nine states around
the sea. Historically, the Baltic Sea area has long been a region of cooperation, shipping and
trade. However, it has also been a region of conflicts and divisions, especially during the
twentieth century, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War.
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The Baltic Sea Region after World War II has been the scene of different security issues,
power politics and environmental problems. This research is focused on environmental
cooperation around the Baltic Sea, mainly since 1974 when the Helsinki Convention was signed.
Environmental cooperation among states in the Baltic Sea Region is an important form of
cooperation as the Baltic Sea is heavily polluted by shipping, urban waste, chemicals, toxic
substances, agriculture and industries. But cooperation among states has also been influenced by
different factors and a changing political climate, starting from the Cold War and ending with the
European Union whereby eight states out of nine belong now in the Baltic Sea Region.
The first part of the thesis gives theoretical background regarding environmental issues
and problems in the field of international relations, focusing on two aspects of global
environmental policy: the Green theory and regime theory. On the one hand, states may have
green thoughts and environmental-friendly policy, on the other hand, international environmental
cooperation, especially as regards maritime environment, depends on how efficiently
international environmental regimes (international organizations and groups of states with
similar environmental problems) among states work. At the end of the first part, the
methodology, hypothesis and research question(s)are also introduced. The general research
question of the thesis is the following one: what have been the contributory factors of different
forms of political cooperation to international environmental governance in the Baltic Sea
region?
The second part of the thesis deals with empirical background: the political context after
World War II, environmental governance since the 1970s and the role of the European Union in
the Baltic Sea Region.
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The third part, empirical analysis, focuses on two major international bodies as regards
international environmental cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region: the Helsinki Commission and
the European Union. This part is divided into three sections: the Helsinki Commission during the
Cold War, environmental cooperation after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the European
Union’s policy in the Baltic Sea area after the enlargement of the European Union in 2004 when
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland became full members and the Baltic Sea almost an
internal sea of the European Union. In the conclusion, the main results of the empirical analysis
of the Master’s thesis are described.
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1. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AS PART OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

This section of the thesis will focus on the role of ‘environment’ in the theory of international
relations. The starting point of this section is how much theories of international relations pay
attention to environmental issues and environmental cooperation among states. The current and
previous level of knowledge on the topics of international environmental governance and
international environmental regimes will help us to evaluate and understand the importance of
environmental problems in international and regional (Baltic Sea) politics. Based on this
knowledge of theoretical perspectives, it will be possible to analyze international environmental
governance and the effectiveness of environmental protection in the Baltic Sea region after
World War II.

1.1 Liberal Institutionalism and International Regimes

At the beginning of the twentieth century environmental problems in the world were not as
significant and serious as at the end of the twentieth century. One of the features of
environmental problems is that they are international and trans-national: they spread from one
state to another, from one sea to another, or from one region to another. If an oil tanker sinks in
the international waters, the pollution caused by the tanker may simultaneously affect coastlines
and territorial waters of many states around the sea or ocean where the disaster occurred, thus
4

affecting also societies, tourism, and economies of many states. Regional or local environmental
disasters can easily become international environmental problems. Environmental problems
affect all states around the world. No state is an island unto itself. Therefore, environment is also
an important aspect of international relations and politics, more today than in the past.
As regards the theory of international relations, one has to come to terms with the fact
that thanks to environmental problems the world has entered a new era which is different from
the nineteenth-century power politics which emphasized a balance of power. The oldest and most
commonly adopted theory of international relations is realism: it is a tradition of analysis in
international relations that emphasizes the way states pursue power politics and protect their own
national interests.1 According to the realist approach states act according to this type of
“thinking” and do not pay too much attention to what were once considered to be secondary
questions like environmental issues. However, realism can deal also with environmental issues,
but based on the assumptions of realist tradition and state-centric worldviews where environment
cannot be more than a secondary issue.
Realists argue that in the conditions of international anarchy states are always concerned
foremost with their own security and interests, focusing on the ways in which other states may
threaten their security. Because of this realists have always paid much less attention to global
environmental change and other types of soft issues in world politics.
Rather than being optimistic concerning possibilities of international cooperation as are
liberal-internationalists, realists have instead generated a research agenda in international
relations theory which focuses on how global environmental change can produce interstate
1

Jack Donnelly, “Realism,” in Theories of International Relations, ed. Scott Burchill et al. (Houndmills, Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 29.
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conflicts. For realists, environmental problems can only mean that the causes of insecurity have
changed (or may change) from military affairs to environmental degradation, whereas the
referent of security remains the same – the nation-state with its interests and security issues. For
instance, based on the realist approach, environmental problems and environmental change
(water scarcity, limited renewable resources, etc.) can lead to interstate wars and conflicts in the
future.2 Thus, realism does not pay attention to the ways how to avoid environmental problems,
but rather how to come to terms with environmental problems, and how to deal with possible
conflicts caused by environmental problems (disruption of the balance of power).
Liberalism in the field of theory of international relations takes a different approach when
it comes to explaining and analyzing global and regional environmental problems and
cooperation among states. As one of the great philosophical frameworks of the European
Enlightenment era, liberalism traditionally focuses its attention on individual liberty, rights,
political

freedom,

democratic

traditions,

equality,

market

capitalism

and

globalization.3According to Daniel Green, liberal international relations theory was originally
ideological, normative and prescriptive, focusing on the creation of an international organization,
international cooperation, increasing interdependence, international law, world peace and
simultaneous domestic and international democratic political orders.4
Liberalism is a theory of international relations where relationships between nation-states
are determined by domestic politics, which ideally should be also democratic. Liberals believe
that in the international arena various rights and liberties should be protected in the same way as
2

Matthew Paterson, Understanding Global Environmental Politics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 18-20.
Scott Burchill, “Liberalism,” inTheories of International Relations, ed. Scott Burchill et al. (Houndmills,
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 55.
4
Daniel Green, “Liberal Imperialism as Global-governance Perspective,” in Contending Perspectives on Global
Governance: Coherence, Contestation and World Order, ed. Alice D. Ba and Matthew J. Hoffmann (London & New
York: Routledge, 2005), 235-236.
3
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they are protected in a democratic state and society.5 One of the rights and liberties that a citizen
and a state should stand for is people’s right to live in a clean and healthy environment. Global
environmental problems are an increasingly important issue today and they are leading or have
already led the world into a new era where environmental problems are common. However, at
least according to the liberal-institutionalist Peter Willetts, it is also naïve to hope that
environmental values will always override basic interests, security, wealth, autonomy and status
of states.6
Different international relation theories vary in the way they see the role of politics, states
and institutions in the world when it comes to solving global environmental problems. Whereas
realism says that global environmental problems are sources of conflicts (paying more attention
to the conflict itself than environmental problem and solution of environmental crisis), according
to liberal institutionalism global environmental change leads to increasing cooperation and
interdependency among nation-states, and thus has led to the emergence of international
environmental regimes since the 1970s.7Liberal institutionalism pays more attention to the
solutions of environmental problems than realism or neo-realism do. According to Matthew
Paterson, social and political problems that transcend state boundaries and become international
problems in the realm of sovereign states become in this way a collective problem and must be
resolved through international cooperation or collaboration. The central devices of international
cooperation since the 1970s are international regimes which explain largely the mechanism of

5

Burchill, 81.
Peter Willetts, “Who Cares About the Environment?” in The Environment and International Relations, ed. John
Vogler and Mark F. Imber (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 121.
7
Paterson, 22.
6
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international environmental politics and global economic politics from the aspects of liberal
institutionalism.8
The study as well as the term of “international regime” emerged during the 1970s, first in
the field of economics, offering a theoretical framework for analyzing economic and political
governance at the international level, especially after the incapability and ineffectiveness of the
United Nations and other organizations or states to deal with increasing international economic
(and environmental)problems.9On the other hand, the emergence of international regimes can be
interpreted also as a response to regional integration in Europe which was inspired by the belief
that conflicts between states would be reduced or avoided by creating economic and political
frameworks among members of the same geographic region.10
One of the most important theoreticians of regime theory, Oran R. Young, defines
international regimes in terms of institutional arrangements: sets of roles, rules, decision-making
procedures, programs and relationships whose members are usually states, but may be also nonstate actors and whose operations and actions center on specific issues and problems associated
with global civil society.“International environmental regimes” are based on ecological criteria
and sustainability, trying to manage and contain international environmental problems.11
Examples of international environmental regimes include the Antarctic Treaty System, different
regional seas arrangements, the Great Lakes water quality regime in the North America, the

8

Paterson, 12.
Oran R. Young, “Regime Theory and the Quest for Global Governance,” in Contending Perspectives on Global
Governance: Coherence, Contestation and World Order, ed. Alice D. Ba and Matthew J. Hoffmann (London & New
York: Routledge, 2005), 88.
10
Burchill, 64.
11
Oran R. Young, Governance in World Affairs (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1999), 10-13, 120.
9
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North Sea management regime and the regime for the protection of the stratospheric ozone
layer.12
At the beginning of the process of launching contemporary environmental regimes to deal
with the transnational and maritime pollution, global warming and sustainable development, the
frameworks of environmental regimes had little political and academic support. However, they
gained more support during the 1980s and 1990s when liberal institutionalism as a discipline of
international relations was formed in a response to the new course in the international relations
theories and to a new mindset in global politics where environmental regimes received more
support and attention. Liberal institutionalism sorted out international cooperation as a central
determinant in global environmental governance and sustainable development.13
Liberal institutionalism emphasizes the role of cooperation among states in maintaining
regularity and predictability in international politics: the world is stabilized by regimes which
constrain state behavior and conform expectations of each state to areas of shared interest.14 As
regards environmental threats and problems caused by human impact on nature, environment and
climate, one of the shared interests of states is to limit environmental degradation and avoid
further international environmental problems.
As a result of the emergence of international regimes, a global community,
institutionalization, globalization, rising environmental problems and the decline of the dominant
actors in the world, regime theory arose as a possible solution to the puzzle of global governance
in the new era. According to regime theory defined by Oran B. Young, states in the international

12

Ibid, 115.
John Vogler and Mark F. Imber, editors, The Environment and International Relations (London and New York:
Routledge, 1996), 3-7.
14
Burchill, 65.
13
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system are defined as utility-maximizing actors and they engage in interactive decision-making
processes, regime formation and international cooperation in which there are mutual benefits
regarding cooperation (states are interested in the success of the regimes) and incentives for the
participants. States may also choose non-cooperative strategies if necessary, but only when there
is no central international authority or government as such.15
According to Paterson, regimes are not the same as specific agreements, particular
international organizations or international institutions. Regimes are narrower in their scope and
can be defined as a subset of international institutions with specific principles, norms, rules and
decision-making procedures. Regimes are important because they are able to change the
behavior of states, and influence interstate collaboration, for example, as a result of specific
global environmental problems (maritime pollution, climate change, carbon dioxide
emissions).However, regimes do not force states, but rather alter incentives facing states and thus
play a profound role in transforming states’ perceptions of their interests.16
According to Oran R. Young, regime theory is based on the assumption that international
cooperation among states is successful only when states are able to form successful international
regimes – international arrangements or sets of roles, rules and relationships. The main question
in regime theory is: what are the causes of successes or failures in the processes of forming and
maintaining international regimes among states in the world. For regime theorists, the formation
of international regimes can be explained by emphasizing the role of power, interests or
knowledge. Those theoreticians who explain the formation of international regimes by
emphasizing power explain the regime as a network where a dominant actor plays the key role

15
16

Oran R. Young, Governance in World Affairs (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1999), 189-190, 120.
Paterson, 12-13.
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by choosing to exert its influence to induce others to agree to cooperation. Those who highlight
the interests of states in the process of the formation of international regimes interpret the
process of regime formation rather as a bargaining process where regimes form only when states
get benefits from striking a bargain. Those who emphasize the role of knowledge as a key factor
in the formation of regimes see discourses and epistemic communities as key elements in
collective action among states.17
However, according to Young, international regime formation is not a purpose in itself,
but is formed to solve a problem. There is the continuous highly structured situation similar to a
prisoner’s dilemma where states either choose cooperative strategy or not, the problems are
solved through the strategy or not, the regimes are formed or not, etc.18Regimes are not always
successfully formed and maintained, and obviously they do not always solve all the problems in
the world. However, regimes are formed to enhance trust, order, stability and continuity; they
develop habits of cooperation, monitoring and sanctioning defectors in the ungoverned and
decentralized world.19
In sum, international regimes are based on the interests and incentives of the participants
(states) rather than power-based frameworks and gains (proposed by international relations
theories of realism and neo-realism). According to Robyn Eckersley, understanding the broader
constellation of interests associated with international regimes helps us to understand also the

17

Oran R. Young, Governance in World Affairs (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1999), 191.
Young, 195.
19
Burchill, 65.
18
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effectiveness of international regimes.20However, regime theory alone cannot be the basis of
analysis of international environmental governance.

1.2 Green Theory in International Relations

After World War II, towards the end of the twentieth century, environmental protection emerged
as an additional and subsidiary task of the Western welfare states. Environmental issues also
became international political problems which needed solutions, although obviously it was not
yet a primary task for states.21However, as time went by, environmental problems became
everyday political problems rather than marginal ones, as they had been before the Second
World War. In the beginning, environmental awareness was marked by the first wave of
environmentalism and international environmental movements of the 1960s and 1970s which
helped to push environmental issues from the margins to the mainstream of public policy
agendas.22For instance, the term “deep ecology” was coined by Norwegian philosopher Arne
Naess which opposed earlier, anthropocentric “shallow” ecology. According to the principle of
“deep ecology”, no one human being or state is given legal or moral dominion over the rest of

20

Robyn Eckersley, The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004), 2829.
21
Eckersley, 79.
22
Steven Bernstein and Maria Ivanova, “Institutional Fragmentation and Normative Compromise in Global
Environmental Governance,” in Global Liberalism and Political Order, ed. Steven Bernstein and Louis W. Pauly
(New York: State University of New York Press, 2007), 164.
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nature.23 Also, the term “social ecology” was coined by Murray Bookchin, which suggested that
environmental degradation is a product of relationships of domination and exploitation of nature
by human beings.24
As regards the first international environmental problems, the United States of America
played the vital and crucial role for the prospects of international cooperation, for instance in the
case of Montreal Protocol in 1987, being able to take an effective lead, whereas more recently
the United States have failed in assuming the leadership of climate change and biodiversity
policy.25On the one hand, international environmental problems have become much severe, on
the other hand there are also other problems in the world (wars, poverty).
According to Paterson, the problem is that political decisions concerning global climate
change are deeply imbedded in the broader reproduction of state, political-economic and
scientific-technological power structures, because of which the neutrality of political decisionmaking cannot always be presumed.26
As a result of the emergence of international environmental regimes and decline of
dominant powers in the world, international relations theories also have to come to terms with
the changed situation. According to Peter Willetts, a different research programme and theory
and a positivist approach for an alternative global international system paradigm are needed.27

23

Eric Laferriere and Peter J. Stoett, International Relations Theory and Ecological Thought (London: Routledge,
1999), 60.
24
Laferriere and Stoett, 63.
25
Robert L. Paarlberg, “Lapsed Leadership: U.S. International Environmental Policy Since Rio,” in The Global
Environment: Institutions, Law, and Policy, ed. Norman J. Vig and Regina S. Axelrod (Washington, D.C.: A Division of
Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1999), 245.
26
Paterson, 9.
27
Willetts, 135.
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Liberal institutionalism and regime theory promote international regimes in solving the
environmental problems in the world. However, according to many scholars, global
environmental regimes have not fulfilled the task of responding adequately to the global
environmental problems for which they originally were designed.28The problem with current
international cooperation in regard to the environment is that international environmental
regimes are bureaucratic and ineffective. A major overhaul of current international
environmental regimes should be undertaken in order to overcome the fragmentation of the
current structure of environmental governance and establish an authoritative international
environmental body “with a first-rate staff, a reputation for analytical rigor, and the capacity to
take on tasks such as dispute resolution.”29
Regarding theories of international relations discussed thus far, while liberal
institutionalism, neo-liberalism, neo-realism and even realism more or less address and deal with
international environmental problems (international environmental regimes, organizations and
institutions) and environmental politics, none of them provide a thorough explanation of how and
why international environmental problems emerge and how they can be solved in international
politics.
Green theory, a more recent theory in international relations, is specifically focused on
environmental protection, the emergence of environmental problems and the human impact on
environment in the contemporary international political context. According to Paterson, the
defining characteristics of Green theory as a competing theory in international relations (side by
side with realism, liberalism and liberal institutionalism) is that it focuses mainly on the role of

28

Bernstein and Ivanova, 170.
Bernstein and Ivanova, 179.
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anthropocentric ethics in reducing nature and the environment to their economic value alone for
human beings and states, and on the questions of limits to growth of human societies.30
The important question as regards Green political theory in international relations is: why
is Green theory needed at all? While the previous theories of international relations had been
sufficient for studying the system of international relations which dominated before World War
II or before the end of the Cold War, they cannot be sufficient for analyzing environmental
issues as a new and increasing subject in politics. Now, as environmental degradation is
inevitable in many parts of the world, based on the literature of Green political theory, the human
impact on ecosystems is the main reason of environmental degradation, and the same theories
which focused on the power politics and international system which have caused environmental
degradation are no longer sufficient to deal with problems caused by nation-states. Moreover, the
state-centric framework of realism cannot satisfactorily explain how international law is
observed by most states most of the time and why basic environmental cooperation between
states occurs routinely.31
According to Eckersley, Green international relations theory is by nature critical,
problem-oriented, interdisciplinary, and normative, promoting environmental justice and
sustainable patterns of development.32
Paterson refers to three major authors in the contemporary literature of Green political
theory in international relations: Robyn Eckersley, Robert Goodin, and Andrew Dobson.
According to Eckersley, the defining characteristic of Green political theory in international
30

Paterson, 35.
Eckersley, 28.
32
Robyn Eckersley, “Green Theory,” in International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010), 255, http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199298334/dunne_chap13.pdf/ (Accessed 29
March 2012).
31
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relations is Ecocentrism which is a view that opposes to anthropocentrism (which leads to
environmental degradation rather than environmental protection) and says that the world is
composed of interrelationships, that all entities are embedded in ecological relationships, and that
there is no rigid distinction between human beings (or states in international relations) and the
rest of the nature.33
According to Robyn Eckersley, one has to revalue the role, function and power of states
in environmental issues and environmental politics. Although the political autonomy of states is
widely believed to be in decline, states possess a monopoly of control over the means of
coercion; accordingly, the coercive arm of states can be used to protect the environment.34 At the
same time, states should pay less attention to pursuit of national security as military training,
weapons production and armed conflicts can also be major causes of ecological degradation in
the world.35
The views of Robert Goodin in Green political theory are based on ethics and values
(‘Green theory of value’) which are defining characteristics and at the center of Green political
theory. According to Paterson, Goodin’s formulation of Green political theory is highly
problematic because he, unlike Eckersley who has a holistic view of ecocentrism, emphasizes a
distinction between natural (non-human) nature and artificial (human) environment and does not
argue so much why the environment is being destroyed by humans. Andrew Dobson’s view of
Green political theory is based on the ‘limits of growth’ argument; based on that argument the
exponential economic growth and industrialization are the root causes of environmental
degradation and crisis in the world. Economic growth has produced a situation where the world
33

Paterson, 36-37.
Robyn Eckersley, The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004), 7.
35
Ibid, 25.
34
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is running out of natural resources and the environment does not have absorptive capacity to
assimilate the waste and pollution caused by industrialization and economic growth. Based on
this Green political theory, the economic and population growth of human societies is the reason
for environmental crises in the world and therefore, human societies may experience collapse in
the future.36
Green political theory tries to analyze and critically assess world politics and the
international relations theories which have been dominant before the current environmental
crisis. International politics which have led to environmental crisis cannot be supported or
maintained if the goal of international system is to save or protect the environment. Paterson’s
argument is that global environmental governance and environmental problems should be
interpreted as phenomena inside the logics of interrelated power structures of the state system,
capitalism, scientific knowledge and patriarchy. According to Paterson, these four basic power
structures have caused the environmental degradation and in order to solve or come to terms with
environmental problems, one should evaluate and critically estimate these power structures.37
According to Paterson, scientific knowledge should be regarded as an underlying
structural cause of environmental problems for two reasons. First, Paterson argues that modern
science was founded on the assumption that humans are separated from the rest of natural world
and thus dominate over the environment, which accordingly has led to anti-ecological attitudes
and practices as nature is regarded as an object for human instrumental use.38The second
argument of Paterson is that scientific knowledge, as knowledge of particular scientific elites,
has taken away control over the environment from individuals and communities who would be
36

Paterson, 36-38.
Paterson, 40.
38
Paterson, 50.
37
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more interested in sustainable management of environments than modern states and modern
scientific elites.39
Green political theory criticizes also the basic components and units of international
systems which are the focus of previous, traditional international relations theories. On the one
hand, Green political theory is against the state-centric worldview. According to Paterson, statebuilding, state systems and state elites have systematically promoted accumulation, in this way
producing environmental change as a product of their internal operation.40 On the other hand,
Green theory emphasizes the role of nation-states, since states, once they act collectively, have
the capacity to limit ecological problems (global warming, nuclear waste) and the
environmentally harmful consequences of capitalism.41
However, international relations theories like realism and neo-liberalism, or liberal
institutionalism, do not pay attention to environmental issues as the most important component
of international relations and world politics. For example, liberal institutionalism focuses on how
international regimes are maintained, formed and how they coordinate the behavior of states in
mutually beneficial ways.42 Therefore Green political theory focuses on environmental issues as
major international problems caused by state political systems and claims industrialism – the
cause of environmental degradation – to be overriding feature common to both capitalism and
communism.43
Green theory is becoming more important in the field of international relations, as the
theory is based on the problems states are facing today, not only explaining the historical
39

Paterson, 51.
Paterson, 43-45.
41
Eckersley, 7-8.
42
Paterson, 13.
43
Andrew Dobson, Green Political Thought (London: Routledge, 2000), 29.
40
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developments of the previous state system (balance of power, formation of international regimes
or interdependence). According to theoreticians Eric Laferriere and Peter J. Stoett, the era of
environmental problems and globalization means that it is an appropriate time to also add
ecological thought and Green political theory to the wide scope of international relations
scholarship in order to understand the relationship between the contemporary political order and
ecological crisis.44

1.3 Methodology

Green political theory and regime theory are going to be the basis for my analysis of
international environmental governance in the Baltic Sea region after World War II. Both
theories have a common issue they are dealing with: environment. Green theory looks at
international politics and political cooperation from the perspective of environmental problems
and Green ideas. Regime theory, on the other hand, tries to look at international political
cooperation from the perspective of how international environmental regimes and forms of
international environmental cooperation (institutions, arrangements, and agreements) among
states work. Therefore together, these two theories form a framework which helps to evaluate the
effectiveness of international environmental governance in the Baltic Sea region. How much
international cooperation has there been based on Green views? How effective are international
environmental regime(s)?These questions are also the starting point for empirical analysis in this
44

Laferriere and Stoett, 165.
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research. Also, how realistic are prospects for solving transnational environmental problems in
the current world, asks Oran B. Young in the book “Governance in World Affairs”.45 The same
question can be asked about the Baltic Sea in the context of the European Union and
international cooperation: the states are dealing with their own national interests, but what
motivates them to solve international environmental problems?
According to Young, the effectiveness of international environmental regimes is based on
an evaluation of how regimes solve environmental problems, or to what extent regime sare able
to avoid further degradation of the environment without solving the problem.46According to
Young, international regimes arise to solve environmental problems. However, it is hard to say
whether an environmental regime has failed or not only based on whether a problem is
absolutely solved, but it is possible to find out which factors lead to the further degradation of
environment and which factors help an environmental regime become more effective in the
future. According to Young, an environmental problem can grow even more severe in the
absence of an international environmental regime.47 Accordingly, the Baltic Sea could be in
much worse condition in the absence of the European Union which may be important to maintain
environmental regimes. Young emphasizes that the core of regime theory is that states have their
motives and mutual benefits derived from international regimes.48 The European Union and its
regulations can be a reason to take part in environmental cooperation.
In sum, based on regime theory there are regimes and institutions which matter in the
politics of contemporary world. In the Baltic Sea region, one cannot ignore the importance of the
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European Union, the Helsinki Commission, international organizations, and other forms of
cooperation among states. During the Cold War and immediately thereafter, cooperation among
states in the Baltic Sea region was less effective than it is now, after the enlargement of the
European Union in 1995 and 2004. However, during the past four decades the development of
international environmental regimes in the Baltic Sea region has been influenced by different
factors: foreign policies, economy, security, civil society, and democratization. International
environmental protection of the Baltic Sea has been influenced by environmental regimes.
How can an environmental regime be more effective based on Green theory? Green
theory emphasizes the role of nature and environment in international relations and human
societies. On the other hand, green theory emphasizes also networks in the political space,
focusing rather on cooperation than the nation-state-centric worldview.49
How does political cooperation help to protect the environment? What are the political
causes of the environmental degradation of the Baltic Sea? Taking into account the green
political theoreticians’ arguments how environmental and ecological problems can be solved in
the broader international level, it is also more understandable why and how the environmental
governance in the Baltic Sea region is in the condition that it is now (what are the reasons of
eutrophication, high level of hazardous substances and problems with wastewater treatment), and
how this environmental cooperation can be increased and made more effective in the future. Or,
why the environmental institutional governance cannot be effective at all in the region based on
the current environmental regimes and low or insufficient level of political cooperation.
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The research question of the thesis is: what are the contributory factors of different forms
of political cooperation to international environmental governance in the Baltic Sea region? The
periods of time on which the research will focus are: 1) the period before the collapse of the
Soviet Union (after World War II until 1991) and the period after the fall of the Iron Curtain and
collapse of the Soviet Union. These periods are comparable in terms of Europeanization,
democratization, economic growth and the enlargement of the European Union. The process of
joining the European Union started in the Baltic Sea region after the collapse of the Soviet
Union.
The expanded research questions are: what are more specifically these different forms
and institutions of political cooperation which are contributing factors to the international
environmental governance of the Baltic Sea region, and how did these forms of political
cooperation and institutions come into existence after World War II? For example, international
and intergovernmental organizations which deal with the environmental protection of the Baltic
Sea have always been influenced by the political climate in the Baltic Sea region. For example,
one could assume that the Helsinki Commission was influenced by the existence of the Soviet
Union (or Iron Curtain, and East-West division) and is influenced by the European Union (the
enlargement of the EU, the EU strategies, research funding, etc.).The effects of the European
Union on the environmental governance and cooperation in the Baltic Sea region is an important
issue, especially if we take into account the period before the collapse of the Soviet Union and
the period after the enlargement of the European Union. For example, while the European Union
is important for international environmental cooperation, the environmental degradation of the
Baltic Sea obviously did not also stop after the collapse of the Soviet Union and after the
enlargement of the European Union. However, the importance of the Helsinki Commission as an
22

intergovernmental organization, side by side with the environmental awareness, has increased
after the enlargement of the European Union in the Baltic Sea region.
But international environmental governance is influenced also by other factors, such as
economic cooperation, the EU-Russia relations, bilateral and multilateral agreements (Nord
Stream gas pipeline). For instance, cooperation between the European Union and Russia can
significantly influence international environmental governance in the Baltic Sea region. Russia,
in the context of the European Union-Russia relations after the enlargement of the European
Union, is not dealing with the nation-states in the Baltic Sea region (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, etc.), but with the European Union as a much larger and more powerful political entity.
On the other hand, the European Union has become one of the most important factors and actors
in the protection of the Baltic Sea also in regards to the relationships between states inside the
European Union: states which are part of the European Union have to play by the rules of the
European Union.
The variables of the current research are international environmental cooperation and the
factors which have influenced it in the Baltic Sea region. The dependent variable is international
environmental cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. The independent variables are factors which
influence or have influenced international environmental governance, including different forms
and institutions of political cooperation, for example – the European Union, cooperation between
the European Union and Russia, the Helsinki Commission and other international organizations,
civil society, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), scientific community, agreements
between nation-states, etc.
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The hypothesis of the thesis is that the protection of the international environment and
international environmental cooperation depends on the effectiveness of the framework of
international political cooperation. For example, this framework can be based the European
Union. In this case, it is necessary to analyze the European strategies towards the Baltic Sea (the
European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, the European Union’s Baltic Sea Region
programme 2007-2013, etc.).On the other hand, the framework can be based on the
intergovernmental organizations which aim at protecting the environment of the Baltic Sea (the
Helsinki Commission).In that case, the thesis will analyze the documents of Helsinki
Commissions (the Helsinki Convention, HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan). Also, based on
literature and documents which evaluate the role of the Helsinki Commission before and after the
collapse of the Soviet Union, a critical assessment of the work of the Helsinki Commission is
needed. Obviously, international environmental governance in the Baltic Sea region has not been
a success story.
In sum, international environmental cooperation does not depend only on attitude of
nation-states towards the environment, although this may be one of the reasons why some states
have more Green politics that do others. But in spite of the fact that one could be optimistic and
hope that there are in a democratic world-order and according to liberal institutionalism more
states which have more environmental-friendly domestic and foreign policy than others, the
protection of the Baltic Sea as a transnational water basin is much more complicated issue. States
have also other interests than the environment as do have people in their societies. However,
according to Paterson, other goals of states have been disrupted by global environmental
problems.50 This can be one of the reasons why states in the contemporary world are more
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willing to cooperate than confront each other, compared to the era of the Cold War. While there
may be a general reason why states around the Baltic Sea protect the environment (at the end of
the day, everybody wants to live in a clean environment), the current thesis will focus on more
specific factors which influence states in the Baltic Sea region to cooperate in order to protect the
environment of the Baltic Sea.
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2. EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND

At the beginning of the Cold War, international environmental cooperation in the Baltic Sea
Region was out of the question: post-war states around the Baltic Sea were not able to cooperate
in the field of environmental issues – although there were already signs of environmental
degradation of the Baltic Sea. However, during the 1960s international cooperation on
environmental issues became used to foster trust between countries that belonged to opposing
military alliances in the Baltic Sea region.51Later on, the Helsinki Commission (since 1970s) and
the European Union (after enlargements in 1995 and 2004) have been the main engines of
international environmental cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region.
This chapter focuses on the background of the international environmental and political
cooperation in the Baltic Sea region since World War II.
The chapter is divided into three parts: the first part is dealing with political context of the
Baltic Sea region after World War II which gives an overview of the early developments in the
political and environmental cooperation in the Northern Europe.
The second part of this section is dealing with international environmental cooperation in
the Baltic Sea region. The Helsinki Convention was the first important form of international
environmental cooperation during the Cold War.
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The third part of this section is dealing with the European Union and The EU Strategy for
the Baltic Sea Region. The European Union is playing a vital part also in the work of the
Helsinki Commission after the EU enlargements as eight out of nine contracting parties of the
Helsinki Commission belong now to the European Union.

2.1 The Baltic Sea Region after World War II: Political Context

According to a book written by Dr. Alfred Bilmanis and published in 1945 in Washington D.C.,
with the title “Baltic Essays”, the Baltic Sea has a certain analogy with the Mediterranean Sea as
it separates and unites simultaneously nine riparian countries – Denmark, Sweden, Finland,
Germany, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.52 While describing the Baltic Sea,
Bilmanis mentions that because of its geographical position, the Baltic Sea lies in the Northern
Europe: “The distance between Kiel and Haparanda, the Swedish port at the most north-eastern
point of the Baltic sea, is roughly 1000 miles, whereas the latitudinal distance across the Baltic
Sea, from east to west, is about 275 miles. To the north lies the Gulf of Bothnia, and to the northeast the Gulf of Finland. To the east extends the large shallow Gulf of Riga, so called after
Latvia’s capital.”53
However, in 1945 the further situation and destiny of the Baltic Sea was determined
rather by political East-West division than by geographical peculiarities or the historical identity
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of the Baltic Sea as a sea in the North. Bilmanis continues: “The Baltic peoples, who during the
middle ages and the Renaissance were the prospective victims of the policy of larger states, came
of age at last and assumed their own life as independent nations. The newly established Baltic
States became economically self-supporting, the Baltic Sea free, and the Baltic ports were more
efficiently operated than ever before. This situation could have been made lasting. But instead of
agreeing to maintain the neutral bridge between them, Germany and Russia, in 1939, returned to
power politics.”54
The Baltic Sea became a divided sea during and after World War II. As the collapse and
division of Germany led to a new political situation in Europe, almost the entire postwar Baltic
Sea region fell under the dominance of Russian power which had for centuries struggled to gain
a presence in the Baltic Sea region.55 Increased Soviet military presence in the Baltic Sea became
unavoidable. The Danish island of Bornholm was liberated by Russian troops, Soviet rule was
established in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the Soviet Union dominated the Allied Control
Commission in Finland where the Soviet Union maintained also a military base until 1955, and
the Soviet Union wrangled with the Swedish government over the delineation of territorial
waters.56
One cannot ignore or undervalue the importance of the Soviet impact on the Baltic Sea
region after World War II. After World War II, the Soviet bloc stretched from the Baltic to the
Adriatic Sea and for almost a half a century the states under Soviet hegemony were removed
from full membership in the European community where they had belonged before World War
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II. A ‘new Eastern Europe’ was formed in the Baltic Sea region, regardless the previous
historical evolution of the states on the eastern shore of the Baltic Sea. The continuous process of
Soviet remodeling of the political, social and economic structures took place on the eastern
shore.57
One of the crucial results due to the division of the Baltic Sea after World War II was that
the two western neutral countries, Finland and Sweden, became the leaders in intergovernmental
negotiations on political cooperation in the Baltic Sea area without provoking political conflicts
between the Great Powers. In late 1960s, Sweden took the first initiative by advocating an
agreement to protect the Baltic Sea from oil discharges from ships which, however, resulted in
no international agreement.58
The underlying problem in the Baltic Sea region was the division of Germany as NATO
countries refused to sign intergovernmental agreements in which the German Democratic
Republic was a contracting party.59
The role of Finland in promoting international cooperation, stabilization and
peacemaking among the states of the Baltic Sea became crucial during the Cold War. The
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), proposed by the Soviet Union, was
regarded as the most important Finnish foreign policy achievement at the time.60
The years after World War II were the years of economic growth, economic
transformation, rise of industrial output, and foundation of modern welfare states in Finland,
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Sweden and Denmark. For example, in Finland World War II was decisive in reshaping society’s
attitude towards welfare provision – the state-sponsored welfare system was established.61
Different was the post-war experience in the newly formed socialist states of the Baltic
Sea region. In the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and Poland, post-war economics
and politics were characterized by forced deportations, collectivization (collective farms and
state farms) and the procurement policies of the Stalinist regime.62 According to David Kirby,
collectivization was a social and economic disaster where pragmatic economic considerations
mattered less than the political imperatives of the Soviet Union.63
According to Clive Archer, during the Cold War period, the whole Baltic Sea region was
enmeshed in the realist and heavily state-oriented understanding of security: the overriding
security concern was the interests of the Soviet Union.64
The collapse of the Soviet Union finally brought change to the Baltic Sea region.
According to Archer, in the 1990s, the Baltic Sea region states recognized that their security
situation had changed as the fear of bipolar conflict in Europe had almost disappeared and new
threats and problems were on the way: ethnic issues, migration, criminality (international crime),
threats to the environment (increasing threat as the new capitalist countries in Eastern Europe
were experiencing economic growth), the spread of disease (open borders).65 In addition, the
impact of the Cold War did not disappear immediately: the armed forces, weaponry, military
basis, etc.
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However, after the Cold War the Baltic Sea region developed a highly dynamic
transnational cooperation and new networks emerged in the area, for example the Union of
Baltic Cities, regional multi-stakeholder approaches like Baltic 21, etc. The Baltic Sea region
appeared to be a fertile ground for transnational networks and international cooperation.66
During the 1990s, environmental issues were often sidelined by more immediate
economic and geopolitical concerns on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea (Poland, Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania).67 Obviously entry into the Euro-Atlantic community was a natural
progression for the states on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea.68 The Baltic States and Poland
chose to pursue the foreign policy goal of full and speedy integration into the European Union
and NATO and in 2004 this goal was achieved.69 At the same time, all the Baltic States and
Poland also had the goal to seek a withdrawal from Russia’s sphere of influence.70
After the end of the Cold War, increasing cooperation among the states in the Baltic Sea
Region occurred on many levels: in September 1991, the Union of the Baltic Cities was founded
in Gdansk, Poland by 32 cities from ten countries around the Baltic Sea: this network was
formed as a tool for the activities and interests of its members. Transnational urban policy
focused on different issues, including environment, health and social affairs, education, society,
tourism, transportation, business, culture, sports, and urban planning.71

66

Marko Joas, DetlefJahn and Kristine Kern, Governing a Common Sea: Environmental Policies in the Baltic Sea
Region (London: Earhscan, 2008), 7.
67
David J. Galbreath, AiniusLašas and Jeremy W. Lamoreaux, Continuity and Change in the Baltic Sea Region:
Comparing Foreign Policies (Amsterdam – New York: Editions Rodopi B. V., 2008), 114.
68
Galbreath et al, 37.
69
Ibid, 1.
70
Ibid, 34.
71
Kristine Kern and Tina Löffelsend, “Governance Beyond the Nation State: Transnationalization and
Europeanization of the Baltic Sea Region,” in Governing a Common Sea, 129-130.

31

2.2 Environmental Governance in the Baltic Sea Region after World War II

The environmental protection of the Baltic Sea became an important political issue for the Baltic
Sea Region after World War II. As a result of pollution, increased marine traffic and general
environmental awareness, scientists started to evaluate the Baltic Sea already by the 1970s as one
of the most polluted seas in the world.72
According to Juha Beurling, the health of the marine environment of the Baltic Sea has
been seriously damaged already since the 1960s as a result of untreated human waste, various
toxic substances and materials, metal (especially lead), urban pollution, industrial water,
agricultural run-off (fertilizers) and wastewater from pulp-and-paper industries.73
The degradation of the environmental status of the Baltic Sea during the late 20th century
had many causes: “The most popular hypothesis starts from the assumption that economic
performance causes environmental problems and increasing economic performance boosts
environmental degradation (prosperity pollution).”74
As a result, environmental issues were placed on governmental domestic political
agendas in Sweden, Finland and Denmark during the 1960s and 1970s. As there was no
international framework or agreement, the main solutions were national point-source pollution
abatement. However, as a result of the cross-border character of pollution in the Baltic Sea, also
some treaty mechanisms and (international and local) control institutions were also created in the
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framework of United Nations already before the 1980s.75Also, in 1968 Finland and the Soviet
Union agreed on bilateral scientific and technological cooperation relating to the Gulf of Finland,
and a few years later Sweden and the Soviet Union engaged in similar bilateral research
cooperation.76
Increased regional and international environmental cooperation among states in the Baltic
Sea area led finally to the formation of Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission, also
called the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM). The Helsinki Commission, as one of the most
important regional environmental organizations now in the Baltic Sea region, is the governing
body of the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area,
which was signed in Helsinki on the 22nd of March 1974.77
The Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area,
widely known as the Helsinki Convention, is a legally binding international treaty.78 At the time
it was signed, it was a pathfinder in the international environmental policy, in the protection of
the marine environments and in Baltic Sea politics generally in many ways. The Helsinki
Convention as a treaty which covered almost all the area of a sea and all the pollutants of the sea
known at the time it was drafted, signed and ratified, was the first of its kind as an international
environmental convention, and was used later as a model by other international environmental
conventions.79

75

Marko Joas and Björn Grönholm, “Local Level Sustainability Policies in the Baltic Sea Area: Local Agenda 21
within the Union of the Baltic Cities Network,” Ambio: A Journal of the Human Environment, Vol. 30, No. 4-5
(2001): 315.
76
Räsänen and Laakkonen, 46.
77
Räsänen and Laakkonen, 54.
78
Kern and Löffelsend, 122.
79
Räsänen and Laakkonen, 44.

33

The first and the most important reason why the Helsinki Convention was signed was
environmental pollution of the Baltic Sea, but this was not the only reason states around the
Baltic Sea decided to cooperate: the Helsinki Convention had also a political dimension and
reason which determined the framework and the contents of the convention.80
In a way the originally signed convention failed to fulfill its purpose. The Helsinki
Convention was revised, updated and broadened in 1992, now including also coastal zone
management, inland waters of the Baltic Sea states and biodiversity. Thus it also became
applicable to the new political situation in the Baltic Sea Region after the fall of the Berlin Wall,
signed by all nine independent states around the Baltic Sea and by the European
Community.81On the other hand, as already mentioned the Helsinki Convention has always had a
political dimension, and it had an extraordinary meaning in the context of the Cold War. In 1974
when the states of the Baltic Sea region signed the Helsinki Convention, the Baltic Sea was
divided both politically and culturally by the Iron Curtain and the main task of the convention
was to harmonize the scientific and technological practices of the seven signatory countries
which included then Denmark, Sweden, Finland, the Soviet Union, Poland, the German
Democratic Republic, and the Federal Republic of Germany.82 Therefore one could say that it
was a remarkable achievement: it was the first multilateral convention which was signed by the
members of two mutually competing military alliances – Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic Treaty
Organization – in addition to the politically neutral states Sweden and Finland.83 This led to
increased political cooperation in the Baltic Sea region during the Cold War.
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The Helsinki Commission as an intergovenmental organization started to operate by 1980
– after the coastal states of the Baltic Sea of the Cold War era had ratified the Helsinki
Convention and the convention officially entered into force.84
The aim and responsibility of Helsinki Commission was to be the main environmental
policy-maker for the Baltic Sea region by ensuring navigation safety, hastening national and
trans-national response to accidents at sea, protecting biodiversity of the marine environment of
the Baltic Sea and developing specific measures to protect the Baltic Sea from land-based and
sea-based pollution.85 The Helsinki Commission in its style and purpose has worked as a
technical-scientific organization responsible for monitoring and compilation of data on the Baltic
Sea marine environment and making certain decisions or recommendations to end the use of
certain pollutants.86 The organization is working mainly through intergovernmental cooperation
between the coastal states of the Baltic Sea. The coordination of intergovernmental
environmental activities is supported by a secretariat in Helsinki where the commission meets
annually and holds occasional ministerial meetings.87
The Helsinki Commission is assisted and supported also by separate committees, experts
and working groups which are dealing with specific issues of the Baltic Sea marine environment,
like monitoring and nature conservation.88
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During its activity for more than three decades the Helsinki Commission has produced
several environmental and operational response networks in the Baltic Sea area which give the
people around the Baltic Sea some hope that the deterioration of one of the most polluted sea
areas in the world can be stopped.89 However, to stop the pollution entirely is impossible.
One of the most important duties of the Helsinki Commission has been to make
decisions, resolutions or recommendations which, however, have an advisory nature and are not
legally binding: these recommendations must only be taken into account in national legislations
and environmental programmes of participants (states) and thus place emphasis on the political
will, national capacities and financial resources of the states concerned.90 Decisions are taken by
the Helsinki Commission unanimously, and most of them take the form of recommendations to
the governments of the contracting parties.91
The

achievements

of

the

Helsinki

Commission

include

approximately

110

recommendations since the beginning of the 1980s, the reduction of industrial emissions and
hazardous substances, new legislation for the prevention of pollution by marine traffic and the
improvement of regional environmental monitoring and assessment.92
The nature of the Helsinki Commission has changed gradually, but it has extended its
role, authority and activities quite significantly. In the beginning, the Helsinki Commission was
restricted by the national security doctrine of the Soviet Union, but after the end of the Cold War
the authority of the Helsinki Commission extended also to the coastal zone of the Baltic Sea.93 In
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addition, the Helsinki Commission has enhanced cooperation with the non-governmental sector,
civil society actors and other stakeholders.94
However, the environmental degradation of the Baltic Sea has not yet stopped. The
countries around the Baltic Sea have become economically more prosperous than they had been
before:
“One explanation for increasing levels of fertilizer consumption in the Eastern riparian
countries may be found in growing competition within the agricultural sectors of these countries
resulting from European Union (EU) membership. However, with the exception of Poland, it
needs to be stressed that the level of fertilizer consumption on arable land in Eastern riparian
countries is substantially lower than that in Western countries (around 3000 kilograms per square
kilometre (kg/km2) of arable land in 2000 in Estonia and Latvia, and 5000 kg/km2 in Lithuania
compared to 10,000 to 22,000 kg/km2 at the same point in time in Western riparian countries).”95
However, the Helsinki Commission is not the only institution dealing with environmental
protection of the Baltic Sea. In 1952 the Nordic Council was established for cooperation among
Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Finland (which joined the council in 1955). In the
framework of the Nordic Council, several programs of environmental cooperation were prepared
and established, including the Nordic Program for the Environment (1989), joint action plans
coverning air and sea pollution issues and promoting cleaner waste and recycling technology in
the Baltic Sea region.96
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Because of the lack of instruments to force states around the Baltic Sea to act in
accordance with the letter of the Helsinki Convention, environmental policy in the Baltic Sea
Region remained inefficient and deficient until the end of the Cold War and even at the
beginning of the 1990s, before the enlargement of the European Union.97 States around the Baltic
Sea actually did not fulfil the recommendations of the Helsinki Commission, and there were
huge differencies between states in adding the recommendations to their domestic legislations
and creating effective means to combat marine pollution.98

2.3 The European Union and the Baltic Sea

Western Europe states (and later the European Union) have played a vital role in environmental
and political cooperation of the Baltic Sea Region during and after the Cold War. Four important
western and European organizations have played an important role in representing the process of
western integration in the Baltic Sea Region: Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO).99
During the 1980s and 1990s, in Western Europe environmental awareness and concern
were growing and gained an important place on the political agenda.100Earlier, traditional
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environmental policies and environmental cooperation in Western and Northern Europe had
rather had a local conservation approach(commissions and associations for nature conservation
and preservation in Denmark).101During the Cold War nation-states were themajor actors in the
field of environmental policy and environmental protection, but as a result of EU enlargement,
the European Union became the principal actor in the field of environmental policy at the
transnational and regional level of the Baltic Sea region.102
After the enlargement of the European Union, the EU started to play an important role in
security and environmental issues of the Baltic Sea area asthe Baltic Sea became almost an
inland sea of the European Union, and the problems of the Baltic Sea affected directly also the
European Union. Eight out of nine Baltic Sea states are now full members of the European
Union. However, for the new Eastern European member states, environmental issues have often
been sidelined by more immediate economic, security and geopolitical concerns: environmental
concerns over the protection of the Baltic Sea marine environmentsurface appeared onthe foreign
policy agendas only when aligned with direct geopolitical issues (Nord Stream pipeline project
between Germany and Russia).103 Therefore, one can still see the differences between the
environmental attitudes of Western Europe and new member states of the European Union on the
eastern coast of the Baltic Sea.
Good examples of the EU policy towards the Baltic Sea are “the European Union’s Baltic
Sea Region Programme 2007-2013” and “the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea
Region” (2009). These political programs concern the eight member states bordering the Baltic
Sea, and focus on topics like economy, environment, sustainable management, regional policies
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etc. Increasingly important is also cooperation between the European Union and Russia which is
not a member state, but belongs to the Baltic Sea region and is engaged in economic and political
activities of the Northern European and Baltic Sea space.104
One of the most significant programs regarding the European Union and the Baltic Sea
Region is The European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region which was launched in 2009
and which quickly became the major way in which the European Union relates to the Baltic Sea
region. The European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region is a macro-regional strategy
which alters relations with and among other institutional actors in the Baltic Sea Region (the
Helsinki Commission, Council of the Baltic Sea States, The Baltic Sea Parliamentary
Conference, and the Baltic Sea States Sub-regional Co-operation).105
The EU strategy is built around four pillars or priority areas: 1) environmental
sustainability, 2) prosperity of the region, 3) accessibility and attractiveness, and 4) safety and
security.106 The strategy has coordinating nature: it does not carry projects on its own, but rather
aims at coordinating international environmental governance around the Baltic Sea.107
The EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region faces many problems and challenges,
regarding funding, political will, international attention, and the wider role and impact of the
strategy.108 It is not yet possible to say whether the strategy has been a successful tool in the
environmental governance of the Baltic Sea.
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The EU strategy for the Baltic Sea Region deals also with problematic interaction with
the non-EU partner of the Baltic Sea – Russia, and with the cooperation between the European
Union and Russia in the Baltic Sea Region.109In a way, the Baltic Sea is a meeting place of EURussia relations. First of all, Russia is obviously an important actor in the Baltic Sea regional
energy structure, being a major supplier of energy resources for the European countries and the
Baltic Sea region countries bordering Russia, the Nord-Stream gas pipeline being one of the
most significant examples of Russia’s newly established and increased interactions with the
European Union.110In addition to natural gas, electricity supplies and power generation facilities
have become important issues in the regional energy dynamics of the Baltic Sea region.111 Russia
has shown its willingness to retain its presence in the electricity markets of the Baltic Sea region
– however, the prospective power plant in the Kaliningrad region of Russia may raise questions
regarding environmental threats.112
In sum, in this chapter I have focused on environmental and political cooperation in the
Baltic Sea region after World War II: first, focusing on political context of the post-war years,
then on the Cold War and the role of the Helsinki Commission, and finally on the impact of the
European Union and the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. Marine environmental protection
in the Baltic Sea region has been a problematic issue which has been influenced by many factors,
including the political situation of the Cold War period and post-Cold War era (the 1990s), the
enlargement of the European Union, economic activities (shipping), marine pollution (oil
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pollution, industrial waste, agriculture, urban waste management), local policies, energy policies,
and by the willingness of the Baltic Sea states to decrease human impact on the sea.
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3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

The empirical analysis of this thesis focuses on the work and co-production of two international
bodies – the Helsinki Commission and the European Union –for two main reasons. First,
pollution and environmental degradation of the Baltic Sea is a trans-boundary and international
(political) problem, not a local one affecting a single state that can be solved by domestic policy.
Although heightened national concern can have impact on governments to take stronger action
on the environment,113effective environmental protection of the Baltic Sea depends on
international cooperation. The environmental situation of the Baltic Sea can be improved only
through international cooperation. Environmental policy of every state of the Baltic Sea Region
also has an impact on the Baltic Sea, but the Baltic Sea is most of all a common water
basin.Therefore, it is important to focus on international, intergovernmental organizations and
trans-boundary cooperation between the nation-states.
Secondly, there is no doubt that these two international organizations – the Helsinki
Commission and the European Union – have already had more impact on the international
environmental governance of the Baltic Sea Region than any other organization or form of
political cooperation. They both have contributed to international environmental cooperation in
the Baltic Sea Region to a certain degree, depending on the political situation and changing
political environment. For instance, the Cold War period and the 1990s put limits on
international cooperation, whereas the enlargement of the European Union contributed to the
environmental cooperation. Although the intergovernmental regimes are often regarded as
113
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endless and ineffectual wordsmiths,114 the impacts of these two organizations on the
environmental protection of the Baltic Sea have not been based only on words, but also on deeds
and real actions, like monitoring, improved navigation safety and waste-water treatment.

3.1 The Helsinki Convention

In order to analyze or evaluate the work, effectiveness, meanings and role of the Helsinki
Commission, one must start from the very beginning: the draft of the Helsinki Convention in
1974. The starting point is the formation of an international environmental regime during the
1970s in the Baltic Sea Region among the contracting parties of the Helsinki Convention.
This part of the analysis will try to answer the following two questions: how was the
Helsinki Commission influenced by the contradictory political situation of the Cold War,
meaning both the division of the Baltic Sea Region (East versus West) and the rise of
environmental awareness in the international arena during the 1970s (conventions, regimes and
international law)? As a matter of fact, the primary reason for the founding of the Helsinki
Commission was environmental degradation of the Baltic Sea, but to a certain extent the
formation of the environmental regime was also a political process and political initiative of
certain states.
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The second question is: how much has the Helsinki Commission influenced and
increased international environmental protection in the Baltic Sea region: in other words, how to
estimate the effectiveness of this international organization as an environmental regime?
There are many ways how to measure effectiveness of a regime. One meaning of
effectiveness with regard to international environmental regimes is based on the extent to which
regimes solve the problems that lead to their formation.115 The other meaning of effectiveness is
based on the behavioral consequences of the members of regime: whether regimes or
international environmental governance play a role in shaping or guiding the behavior of
member states of international regimes.116 Based on these two criteria of effectiveness also the
following analysis is conducted.
According to the former Executive Secretary of the Helsinki Commission, Anne
Christine Brusendorff, the Helsinki Commission has been the main environmental policy-maker
for the Baltic Sea Region by developing specific measures to protect and conserve the unique
marine environment of the Baltic Sea.117Brusendorff maintains that these environmental gains of
the Helsinki Commission validate the belief that the deterioration of one of the most polluted
seas in the world can be stopped and the state of the marine environment of the Baltic Sea
improved.118This is one way how to evaluate the effectiveness of the environmental regime.
However, the efforts of this organization have not been entirely successful–the condition
of the Baltic Sea has been deteriorating also during the time the Helsinki Commission has been
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existent. The degradation of the environmental status of the Baltic Sea occurred also during
the1970s, 1980sand 1990s for many reasons, economic growth and increased prosperity of the
coastal states and societies being the main ones.119For example, pollutants of the Baltic Sea are
caused also by car traffic which has increased substantially in most Eastern European riparian
countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union.120One could ask, was the Helsinki Commission
able to reduce human impact on the Baltic Sea, or were the efforts of the Helsinki Commission
rather of marginal importance in solving the environmental degradation of the Baltic Sea?
According to Tuomas Räsänen and Simo Laakkonen, pollution of the seas is an excellent
example of so-called “tragedy of the commons” – the concept first used by Garrett Hardin in
1968 – as no single state around a sea or on the shore of an ocean or sea claims ownership of the
seas, and once the serious degradation of the marine environment occurs, states lack capacity,
strength, financial and scientific ability and knowledge to limit the degradation and the will to
claim political responsibility.121 However, once the situation is bad enough, there is no choice
any more: states must act in order to save their environment, including coastal areas, high seas,
islands, archipelagos as sensitive regions, maritime environment of the territorial waters, etc..
The environmental situation, on the other hand, influences also the societies, tourism and
economies of the coastal states, and therefore it is in the interests of the coastal states to protect
the sea.
A similar thing happened to the Baltic Sea already at the end of the 1960s: states around
the Baltic Sea lacked both capacity and will to cooperate politically or start solving the
environmental problems of their common sea, but the Baltic Sea was also politically divided sea
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as there was the Iron Curtain between the east and west coast of the sea. However, the Helsinki
Convention was an exception in that unfriendly political environment where states were dealing
only with their national interests and military capacity, but not with soft political issues like
environment. In a way, the Helsinki Convention was a step towards the end of East-West
division in the Baltic Sea Region.
According to Egbert Tellegen, the Baltic Sea is the most trans-boundary sea between
Eastern Europe and Western Europe, and abatement of transnational pollution of the Baltic Sea
was recognized as a common interest of both Western and Eastern European countries
surrounding the Baltic Sea at the beginning of the 1970s.122 Therefore, in 1974 the countries
surrounding the Baltic Sea (Denmark, Finland, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Polish People’s Republic, Sweden, and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics) were able to sign the Helsinki Convention on the Protection of the Marine
Environment of Baltic Sea. What was the meaning of this convention and why did states sign it?
This is an important question.
First of all, this was a process of institutionalization of an international environmental
regime in the context of the Cold War: as the environment of the Baltic Sea needed protection
and the sea is not owned by any of the coastal states, this was an appropriate situation for
building a comprehensive international environmental regime in the Baltic Sea Area.123 Also, the
situation of the 1970s was slightly different from the situation of the early Cold War during the
1950s: significant progress had been made in so-called German question and border disputes
between the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland. Finally, as environmental issues started to
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be in the political agendas all around the world, also the idea of an international environmental
conference and multilateral agreement on the pollution of the Baltic Sea was realized in the early
1970s.124During late 1960s and early 1970s sovereign states in the Western world established
several international environmental regimes of marine protection in order to solve the problem of
environmental degradation.125 For instance, the Oslo Convention, the International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), and the Paris Convention were
established at the beginning of the 1970s. In particular, MARPOL (1973) was adopted as a result
of numerous tanker accidents at the seas during the years of 1976 and 1977,and it aimed at
preventing and minimizing pollution from ships, including both accidental pollution and
pollution from routine operations.126
However, what was the meaning of multilateral Convention on the Protection of the
Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area in the international system of the Cold War in the
Baltic Sea Region? Was it an extraordinary achievement, did it fulfill the expectations, or was it
just a marginal victory? Or, was it a first step in the long process of further mutual cooperation in
the Baltic Sea Region? Was it a success story in spite of the fact that environmental degradation
of the Baltic Sea continued?
According to James Gustave Speth and Peter M. Haas, international environmental
treaties are referred to as multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) which can take the
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form of broad conventions or more specific and typically action-oriented protocols or they can
also codify or advance international law in a broad or specific area like the Law of the Sea.127
According to Speth and Haas, those treaties or conventions, once they are ratified by
governments, are sometimes referred to also as international environmental regimes, but the
regime concept is wider and used also more broadly than just a treaty or convention.128
What does a treaty or convention mean for a state? According to Speth and Haas, another
distinction which is important in international law, is the difference between signing and
ratifying a treaty. Usually, major treaties and amendments to treaties typically require ratification
by contracting governments: ratification is a process where the domestic legislation or rulemaking body approves the treaty and converts it to domestic law, but these processes underscore
that adoption of treaty commitments is voluntary and does not entail any sacrifice of national
sovereignty. The last point is reinforced by the fact that contracting parties can leave a treaty at
any time if they want.129However, when a government signs a treaty, it merely indicates
preliminary support for the commitments written in the treaty.130
This leads to the question of the importance of the Helsinki Commission for state
behavior in the context of the Cold War. The Helsinki Convention was ratified by all the coastal
states of the Baltic Sea not before 1980, whereas the Helsinki Commission as an
intergovernmental organization and governing body of the Helsinki Convention was established
already in 1974.131 The fact that states around the Baltic Sea were able to form an

127

Speth and Haas, 83.
Ibid.
129
Ibid.
130
Ibid.
131
Räsänen and Laakkonen, 54.
128

49

intergovernmental organization was a proof that further cooperation between them was
necessary.
On the one hand, the Helsinki Convention was an achievement in the period it was
signed: it was unique in its comprehensive approach to protection of the marine
environment.132The Helsinki Convention (1974) prescribed the general attitude how the Baltic
Sea states should or are recommended to deal with the Baltic Sea as common resource:
“The Contracting Parties shall individually or jointly take all appropriate legislative,
administrative or other relevant measures in order to prevent and abate pollution and to protect
and enhance the marine environment of the Baltic Sea Area.”133
According to Anne Christine Brusendorff, the Helsinki Convention of 1974 provided the
basis for later environmental improvements of the Baltic Sea by the Helsinki Commission. The
work of the Helsinki Commission after the ratification of the Helsinki Convention increased and
deepened scientific knowledge of the state of the Baltic Sea and collected knowledge of the
factors affecting the state of the sea, collected data, served as provider of supportive information
to decision-makers (governments), focused on the prevention of all sorts of pollution from ships
and co-operation in case of accidents at sea, encouraged regional cooperation, and made
recommendations limiting or eliminating the use of specific substances recognized as harmful to
marine ecosystems.134
However, one could ask how was it possible that states around the Baltic Sea in the
suspicious and paranoid context of the Cold War were able to cooperate in the field of
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environmental protection while they were not so successful in other types of cooperation: in the
fields of economy, transportation and education (science and research), for example.
According to Alexander L. George, the way in which leaders of nation-states view each
other is of fundamental importance in determining what happens in relations among
states.135Therefore, as Finland was the key actor in emphasizing environmental issues in the
Baltic Sea Region, also the Soviet Union as a military superpower saw environmental
cooperation as a new challenge in the Baltic Sea Region. One can even argue that the Soviet
Union used environmental issues as a new tool of power politics in the Baltic Sea Region.136The
Convention was drafted and signed against the general context of Cold War rivalry in the Baltic
Sea Region.137 This paradox can be explained by the fact that the emphasis of the Helsinki
Convention was on neutral issues in the context of the political atmosphere of the Cold War:
environment affects every state, whether it is a weak or strong state, communist or capitalist
state, Eastern or Western (European) state.
On the other hand, the Helsinki Convention had limited capacity: the convention did not
play the key role in the Baltic Sea Region during the Cold War period, and environmental gains
of the Helsinki Commission were rather modest during the 1970s and 1980s in terms of real
actions: there were differences between contracting parties of the convention, violations, etc.
According to Tellegen, before the fall of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern
Europe in 1991, common efforts to protect the Baltic Sea were limited mainly to the prevention
of pollution by ships: for instance, the protection of national sovereignty and state
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secrecyhindered inclusion of land-based activities and inland waters surrounding the Baltic Sea
as also sources of pollution – the inclusion of land-based and inland water pollution was
particularly resisted by the Soviet Union and probably there were certain reasons for that.138
The Helsinki Convention (1974):
“While the provisions of the present Convention do not apply to internal waters, which
are under the sovereignty of each Contracting Party, the Contracting Parties undertake, without
prejudice to the sovereign rights, to ensure that the purposes of the present Convention will be
obtained in these waters.”139
Also, the Helsinki Convention was limited to the prevention of pollution by only certain
type of ships (commercial vessels, passenger ships, etc.), and thus did not include all ships (naval
vessels, warships etc.):
“The present Convention shall not apply to any warship, naval auxiliary, military aircraft
or other ship and aircraft owned or operated by a State and used, for the time being, only on
government non-commercial service.”140
The comprehensiveness of the Helsinki Convention was derived from the limited area
that the Convention covered geographically and this enabled states to focus only on solving
complex environmental problems.141 What this means is that the Helsinki Convention of 1974
was not aimed at solving local and specific regional environmental problems (for instance, waste
water treatment in Kaliningrad oblast or in Saint Petersburg), but rather more comprehensive,
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and unfortunately more blurred international environmental and maritime problems like safety
and pollution which are more general by nature. The Convention was not specific, but
comprehensive, in both a negative and positive way. The positive aspect would be that it
supported cooperation between states around the sea:
“Although the Convention established internationally legally binding obligations to be
undertaken by each Member State, it primarily created the legal basis for a close and permanent
co-operation among the Member States.”142
The negative aspect is that the Helsinki Convention was rather blurred than focused on
the specific problems of the sea, like waste-water treatment of urban areas or industrial waste
from coastal industries. It was more convenient for states to focus on general issues.
According to Speth and Haas, some international environmental regimes addressing
marine pollution, ocean dumping and whaling have had considerable success, but in international
environmental regimes concerning protection of marine fisheries economic interests routinely
trump good and neutral science.143
This leads us to the question of the effectiveness of the Helsinki Convention as an
environmental regime. What would have happened without the Convention? According to Speth
and Haas, in measuring regime effectiveness, the conceptual framework starts with three levels
of accomplishments: first, what the situation would have been without the environmental regime;
second, what is the actual performance obtained under the environmental regime; and third, what
is the best result that could be accomplished. The difference between the situation without the
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regime and actual performance obtained under the regime is a measure whether environmental
regimes matter.144
According to Anne Christine Brusendorff, the Helsinki Commission has produced many
environmental gains over the past thirty years (recommendations, monitoring, science)145 –
therefore one can assume that the situation without the environmental regime would have been
much worse than it is today, there would be no recommendations or regulations, and therefore, it
would be only up to environmental awareness and responsibility of every single state how to
protect the vulnerable marine environment.
At the beginning of the current part of the analysis, two main questions were formed:
how the Cold War influenced the formation of the environmental regime of the Helsinki
Convention and how much the Helsinki Commission has influenced the environmental
governance of the Baltic Sea Region. In sum, the paradox of the Cold War was that, on the one
hand, the political situation did not support political cooperation in solving the German question
and changing the Soviet Union from a closed and isolated system, but on the other hand the Cold
War was a good soil for starting international environmental cooperation and launching an
environmental regime – the environmental issues were neutral issues and international
cooperation was possible mainly based on such kinds of issues (not, for example, economic
issues).
Many factors influenced the work of the Helsinki Commission in the early days. The
Helsinki Convention had limited capacity as the political climate of the Cold War was
determined by hard realist politics (the convention did not apply to warships) and states were not
144
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legally forced to fulfill the purposes of the Helsinki Convention. The Helsinki Convention was
not ratified by all states before 1980: a treaty enters into force only after its
ratification.146However, the intergovernmental organization called the Helsinki Commission was
formed already in 1974.
The Helsinki Convention was a basis for a more efficient international environmental
regime in coming decades. It set a course for the environmental policy and international
environmental governance in the Baltic Sea Region already before the collapse of the Soviet
Union. In a way, the Helsinki Convention was a unique achievement at the time it was signed
and ratified by the coastal states of the Baltic Sea. It formed an environmental regime which
aimed at protecting an entire sea from pollution. The role of the environmental regime can be
viewed as decisive in the international and environmental cooperation of the Baltic Sea area.
Without the regime the situation of the Baltic Sea would be worse.
The work of the Helsinki Commission was rather a political process than a process
caused by environmental awareness of states like the Soviet Union: how much did the Soviet
Union actually pay attention to environmental problems? Actions of different states were caused
by their perceptions of the political environment in the Baltic Sea Region: as environment
seemed to be a neutral international issue, hostile states in the context of the Cold War on the
opposite shores of the Baltic Sea were able to cooperate in the field of environment whereas
there are no other good examples of cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region among states in the
Cold War climate of the 1970s.
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3.2 A New Political Situation

This section of the analysis focuses on the environmental regime of the Baltic Sea Region
during the 1990s, based on a renewed and revised Helsinki Convention. What were the impacts
of the new political situation on the international environmental governance in the Baltic Sea
Region? How do we estimate the effectiveness of the Helsinki Commission during the new era?
Once communism collapsed and the Iron Curtain between the East and the West disappeared, the
situation was appropriate for a better cooperation, but also for increased prosperity, economic
growth and increased human impact on the marine environment.
At the beginning of the 1990s a new era in the history of the Helsinki Commission was
launched, caused by political changes in Europe: the emergence of new independent states on the
eastern shore of the Baltic Sea (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), the collapse of communism in
Eastern Europe (Poland, Baltic States), the reunification of Germany, and developments in
international environmental and maritime law which led to the increased environmental
awareness in the world more generally.147
This new political situation led to a revised Helsinki Convention (1992), signed bystates
bordering the Baltic Sea and the European Commission. The new version of the Helsinki
Convention led to the changed role, effectiveness and significance of the Helsinki Commission
as an intergovernmental organization and governing body of the Helsinki Convention.
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According to Brusendorff, the new era of the Helsinki Commission is characterized by
new principles and approaches of the work of the Helsinki Commission since 1992:148
1) The expansion of the area of the work of the Helsinki Commission, or so-called
“Convention Area” – in addition to the Baltic Sea itself also the inland waters became
subject to the marine environmental protection
2) The expansion of the area in which the coastal countries of the Baltic Sea are
committed to implement the provisions of the Helsinki Convention and pertinent
Recommendations, or so-called “Area of Application” – in addition to the sea area the
area of application was enlarged to include also the catchment area
3) A recognition of the need to mobilize financial resources and increase cooperation
and co-ordination between the Helsinki Commission and international financial
institutions – the work of the Helsinki Commission was expanded to include not only
the coastal countries of the Baltic Sea, but also the countries in the catchment area of
the Baltic Sea, including Belarus, Ukraine, the Czech Republic and Slovakia: an
approach was taken that use pre-feasibility studies to identify pollution hot-spots and
insure this identification would lead to the design of projects capable of attracting
funding.
4) The expansion of the work of the Helsinki Commission to cover also nature
conservation, biodiversity issues and sustainable use of the natural resources of the
Baltic Sea Area as parts of the area of the Helsinki Convention
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5) The shift towards a sector-wise approach to address also land-based pollution from
point and diffuse sources and a change towards promoting best available techniques
and best environmental practices rather than setting limit values
6) The change in the work of the Helsinki Commission on land-based pollution sources,
the emphasis was now placed on the harmonization of measures with those taken in
the European Union and the similar organizations, like the sister organization of the
Helsinki Commission in North-East Atlantic Ocean, the OSPAR Commission.
These changes in the work of the Helsinki Commission during the 1990s, on the other
hand, characterize the ineffectiveness of the older version of the Helsinki Convention and the
former work of the Helsinki Commission. According to Speth and Haas, there are many
impediments to effective international environmental cooperation, but those impediments should
not be viewed fatalistically, but critically – as pointing to corrective actions on the environmental
and political front that are needed.149 The Helsinki Convention of 1992 is an example of the
political will of contracting parties to improve the effectiveness of the current environmental
regime. The environmental regime was expanded according to the new political situation on the
eastern shore of the Baltic Sea, and according to the environmental degradation of the Baltic Sea.
According to Speth and Haas, effectiveness of international environmental regimes has
been widely studied – academics and scholars all around the world have sought to identify
factors that contributed to enlarged international environmental cooperation and environmental
protection.150 According to Speth and Haas, effective international regimes are those regimes that
lead nations to make policy changes that support the goals of the regimes, leading to the results
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which indicate that there are improvements in environmental quality.151For instance, if the
Helsinki Convention would have led the Russian Federation to make policy changes that would
support the goals of the Helsinki Convention in Kaliningrad the work of the Helsinki Convention
would be regarded as more successful and efficient than it is now.
It is important to mention that the regime does not force states to solve a problem.
However, during the 1990s the Helsinki Commission launched certain goals which were
supposed to be the basis for policy changes in environmental issues: for instance, countries
around the Baltic Sea agreed on the Baltic Sea Joint Comprehensive Environmental Action
Program in 1992 which had six broad goals:152
1) Establishment of a long-term environmental management framework in each country
of the Baltic Sea Region
2) Institutional strengthening, human resource development in the Baltic Sea Region
3) Launching a program for infrastructure investment in specific measures to control
point and non-point sources of pollution and to minimize and disposal of wastes
4) Management of coastal lagoons and wetlands
5) Supporting applied research to build the knowledge base needed to develop solutions
6) Encouraging public environmental awareness and education.
While these goals did not cause a policy change immediately, a new course was set for
policy change. Oran R. Young points out that the disappearance of the problem that led to the
formation of environmental regime does not justify the conclusion that the regime had no effect
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at all.153 But if an environmental regime does not solve a problem at all the regime cannot be
regarded as effective either. According to Young, the following questions are important in
determining the effectiveness of an international regime: “Do regime members take vigorous
steps to implement regime rules or commitments within their domestic jurisdiction? Do states or
subjects operating under their auspices comply with regime rules or live up to the commitments
they make in creating regimes?”154
According to the statements of the officials of the Helsinki Commission, its work has had
many impacts on the environmental governance of the Baltic Sea after the Cold War. According
to Brusendorff, the encouraging results and achievements of the Helsinki Commission include
the following examples:155
1) All in all, the degradation of the Baltic Sea has slowed– in fact, one has to take into
account also economic growth in the Baltic Sea Region after the collapse of
communism and ask what would have happened without the environmental regime
2) Many positive improvements in the state of the marine environment of the Baltic Sea
have been observed lately by scientists and scholars
3) The Helsinki Commission has been working through 200 Recommendations thanks to
which coastal countries have significantly reduced discharges of organic pollutants
and nutrients
4) Overall reduction in the emissions of oxygen-consuming substances has been
achieved since the early 1990s
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5) Many hot spots have been eliminated: 81 out of the 162 major pollution hot spots in
the Baltic Sea have been successfully eliminated since 1992
6) Special legislation to prevent pollution from ships has been developed by the Helsinki
Commission, including measures to eliminate illegal discharges by ships into the
Baltic Sea and to ensure navigation safety
7) The Helsinki Commission has established joint monitoring of the state of the marine
environment and carried out regular assessments as a precondition for evaluating the
need for new protection measures: in fact, how do we know about the environmental
state of the sea if there is no monitoring and information?
These achievements of the Helsinki Commission are examples of effectiveness and
achievements of the work of the Helsinki Commission after 1992.The new Helsinki Convention
was signed as a result of the changes in Europe: the political climate had improved in the Baltic
Sea Region, there was appropriate soil for increased environmental cooperation, and states had
motives to cooperate. Speth and Haas state that examples of effective environmental regimes are
those where the environment is confidently believed to be improved or on the path of
improvement; these include the stratospheric ozone regime, the European acid rain treaty, efforts
to protect the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, international protection of Antarctic living resources,
the regulation of ocean dumping and marine pollution from ships, whereas examples of
ineffective environmental regimes include regimes where the results are more disappointing, like
deforestation in Indonesia, management of toxic substances and nitrogen pollution.156
Once it is known what conditions, factors and initiatives further the effectiveness of
international environmental regimes states will know where to invest money and political will
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for better results.157The new Helsinki Convention (1992) was an example how the goals of the
Helsinki Commission were applied to the new political situation: there was no fear of major
conflict any more between states around the Baltic Sea, environmental degradation became more
important than the hard politics of nation-states and it was up to states how to save the sea.
On the other hand, while the Helsinki Commission has been able to improve the
environment of the Baltic Sea in some respects (listed above), and can be regarded and classified
as successful international environmental regime, the Helsinki Convention has been unable to
solve other severe environmental problems of the Baltic Sea. For instance, nutrient pollution in
the Baltic Sea region has remained a serious and unsolved environmental problem and important
political issue already since the late 1980s when the 50 % reduction target for nutrient input was
set up.158 Also, environmental degradation may be caused by economic growth.159 Is an
environmental regime supposed to act as an impediment to economic growth?
In sum, a new and revised Helsinki Convention signed in 1992 changed the role of the
Helsinki Commission as an environmental policy-maker in the Baltic Sea Region: this
intergovernmental organization now became a considerable international body with initially
remarkable achievements. Also, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of
communism on the eastern shore of the Baltic Sea there was an appropriate political situation in
the Baltic Sea Region to expand and enlarge the area of the Helsinki Convention, the meaning of
pollution and the political responsibility of states around the Baltic Sea.
The change of the work of the Helsinki Commission enabled states around the Baltic Sea
to cooperate and coordinate their environmental policies more efficiently than before. However,
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the environmental degradation was not stopped as shipping, industries, and agriculture still had
impact on the environmental condition of the Baltic Sea.
All in all, the role and work of the Helsinki Commission during the time changed, as did
the political situation in the Baltic Sea Region. In the context of political changes, a new Helsinki
Convention led to an extended role of the Helsinki Commission in the Baltic Sea Region.

3.3 Environmental Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region after the Enlargement of
the European Union

The current part of the analysis focuses on an environmental regime in the Baltic Sea
Region formed after 2004 based on the enlargement of the European Union – eight out of nine
states in the Baltic Sea Region formed the group of states which had similar goals as regards
environmental governance of the Baltic Sea and belonged also to the Helsinki Commission.

As already mentioned before, there are many ways how to evaluate the effectiveness of
an environmental regime: Oran R. Young maintains that a limited approach to effectiveness of
an environmental regime focuses on the extent to which the regime succeeds in solving the
problem that led to the formation of the regime.160 This kind of approach is limited as it does not
pay attention to other aspects of the regime: for example, controlling a situation can also be an
160
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achievement and a purpose in itself. An environmental regime may have managed to avoid major
environmental or shipping disasters in a region, as a result of increased monitoring and maritime
safety regulations. For example, in spite of the fact that there are still signs of environmental
degradation of the marine environment of the Baltic Sea, there have been no severe oil disasters
in the Baltic Sea Region.
Another way to evaluate the effectiveness is to focus on behavioral consequences of the
international environmental regime – namely, how regimes play a role in shaping or guiding the
behavior of those who are formal members of the international regime (governments and states),
international agencies, interest groups and also individuals.161However, regimes are only one of
number of forces that shape the behavior of states.162 For instance, there may be also other issues
at stake, including security and energy policy which may lead to policy change or environmental
awareness.
The current part of the analysis is based on the assumption that the governments of
nation-states as principal actors in making international environmental policy respond to pressure
from a number of external and internal forces, like other nations, the work of the United Nations,
international organizations (the European Union, the Helsinki Commission), NGOs (nongovernmental organizations), and nation-states’ own business sectors and domestic factors.163
Because of that, international environmental politics can be regarded as a two-level game where
one playing field is domestic politics and the other international politics.164
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Once Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland joined the European Union, a club of Baltic
EU Member States included almost all the Baltic Sea Region, leaving Russia the only
contracting party of the Helsinki Convention not belonging to the European Union. The
enlargement of the European Union led to a completely new political situation in the Baltic Sea
Region: the large area of the Baltic Sea and its catchment area became covered by the EU
regulations, directives and marine strategy.165Also, some decision-making powers were directly
delegated to Brussels and Baltic Sea Region states had to contribute to implement EU
regulations.166 This is a clear example how the European Union had a strong impact on state
behavior in the Baltic Sea Region in regard to environmental policy and cooperation. The work
of the European Union became a contributory factor to the international environmental
governance of the Baltic Sea Region and formation of a new environmental regime, based on
European Union regulations and directives which coordinated also the work of the Helsinki
Commission. How to estimate the effectiveness of this environmental regime compared to the
environmental regime of the 1990s and the environmental regime based on the first draft of the
Helsinki Convention (1974)?
According to Speth and Haas, there are many factors which lead to more effective
international environmental regimes, including cooperative political factors which make it easier
for states to reach meaningful agreements (groups of states, blocs of countries, and negotiations),
capacity constraints (environmental technology), and heightened national concern (media, public
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opinion) which also pressures governments to take stronger actions on international
environmental issues.167
When states around the Baltic Sea entered the European Union, they became a bloc of
countries in the European Union with a common sea – the Baltic Sea. As a result they became
countries with similar environmental awareness, interests, attitudes and political will to act in a
certain way. The Baltic Sea environmental regime (the work of the Helsinki Commission) was
supported by the directives of the European Union. For instance, one of the important goals of
the Helsinki Commission is to reduce human induced eutrophication to desirable levels, but
similar goals and principles also has the EU Water Framework Directive regarding the coastal
waters of the Baltic Sea.168 Also, the Helsinki Commission works in accordance with the EU
Common Agricultural Policy concerning impact of agriculture as one of the most important
environmental problems of the Baltic Sea. Special characteristics of the Baltic Sea marine
environment are fully accounted for in the maritime and environmental politics of the European
Union: for instance, European Marine Strategy foresees an Action Plan for each eco-region of
the European Union.169Accordingly, on the 15th of November 2007, the HELCOM Baltic Sea
Action Plan was adopted in Krakow, Poland where statesagreed to more specific actions to
achieve a good environmental status of the Baltic Sea by 2021.
The HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan differed from previous environmental activities
and programs of the Helsinki Commission on three main points:170
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1) The expansion of stakeholders who had an active role in the work of the Helsinki
Commission in the drawing up of the HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan: in addition
to governments, also international organizations, NGOs, and individual citizens were
supposed to take part in forming the plan
2) This time the Helsinki Commission defined governments’ common vision of a
healthy Baltic Sea by using ecological objectives for the Baltic marine biodiversity,
combating eutrophication, curbing inputs of hazardous substances and ensuring
maritime safety
3) The HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan was implemented via targeted and costeffective measures.
According to the HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan (2007), the overall goal of the
Helsinki Commission is to keep the Baltic Sea unaffected by eutrophication – a major problem
of the Baltic Sea already since 1900 as the Baltic Sea has changed from an oligotrophic clearwater sea into a eutrophic marine environment.171
In the framework of the HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan, the Helsinki Commission
adopted the following goals and ecological objectives in order to describe the characteristics of
the Baltic Sea: concentrations of nutrients close to natural levels, clear water, and natural levels
of algal blooms, natural distribution and occurrence of plants and animals, and natural oxygen
level.172 On the other hand, the wider goal of the HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan was to stress
the further need to co-ordinate and harmonize the work of the Helsinki Commission within the
HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan to initiatives at the international level, including the EUMarine
171
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Strategy Directive, the EU Maritime Policy and the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian
Federation.173
The HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan emphasized that the general state of the Baltic Sea
can only be improved through combined efforts and integrated actions.174 The plan emphasizes
also the cooperation between science and policy.
According to Speth and Haas, two characteristics of the international organizations can
influence outcomes of the international environmental regimes and the willingness of contracting
parties to cooperate:175
1) Horizontal linkages: these refer to overlapping memberships in organizations or
regimes in which countries are members: for instance, the European Union is dense
with horizontal linkages and therefore EU member states are more likely to comply
with EU directives and norms and environmental treaties when those treaties become
part of EU commitments, as is the case with the Helsinki Commission and its
environmental treaties
2) Vertical linkages: these refer to broadly accepted international norms that can be
applied to govern state behavior in particular domains: for instance, if environmental
issues are conducted under the auspices of United Nations Environmental Programme
(UNEP) or International Maritime Organization (IMO), or even EU Maritime Policy,
then those norms of environmental protection and sustainable development will be
accorded higher priority, and the environmental protection will be more effective.
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After the enlargement of the European Union, when Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and
Poland became full member states of the European Union, the environmental governance of the
Baltic Sea Region became influenced by the policy of the European Union. This fact helps to
reevaluate the wider role and importance of the European Union in the Baltic Sea Region and the
effectiveness of the environmental regime based on the European Union. What would happen in
the absence of the European Union? How would environmental governance be conducted
without the European Union?
According to Oran R. Young, there are three types of regime consequences: outputs,
outcomes and impacts.176 The outputs are regulations, programs and organizational arrangements
that actors establish to operationalize the provisions of a regime, moving from words to
deeds.177The outcomes include changes in the behavior of members of regime (for example,
states of the European Union in the Baltic Sea Region), and impacts are effects and solutions of
problems.178
For instance, the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region is an example of output. The
European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region was launched in 2009, concerning the eight
member states bordering the Baltic Sea and catchment area of the Baltic Sea:
“The Strategy covers the macro-region around the Baltic Sea. The extent depends on the
topic: for example on economic issues it would involve all the countries in the region, on water
quality issues it would involve the whole catchment area, etc.”179
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What was the impact of the EU strategy for the Baltic Sea Region on the environmental
cooperation in the Baltic Sea area? What was the role and meaning of the strategy? As the Baltic
Sea has been basically an ‘inland sea’ of the European Union since 2004, with the exception of
Russian territories, environmental governance of the Baltic Sea becomes gradually unified over
the whole region in accordance with the guidelines of the EU environmental policy.180According
to Yrjö Haila, unification of environmental policy is a process with two different impacts. On the
one hand, unification of environmental policy helps to assess environmental problems and
integrate environmental goals within other sectors of public policy.181On the other hand,
environmental policy is made up of a highly heterogeneous set of specific environmental
problems (like eutrophication, waste-water treatment), and at some level of resolution, also
differentiation of policy instruments and differentiation of ways of implementation may be
necessary.182
The EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region has become the major way in which the
European Union relates to the Baltic Sea environment, altering relations in and among other
institutional actors.183 According to Rikard Bengtsson, macro-regional strategies have become
one of the catchwords of contemporary European Union debate.184
The EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region is built around four pillars:185
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A. To make the Baltic Sea an environmentally sustainable place through reducing
nutrient inputs, preserving natural zones and biodiversity, reducing the use of
hazardous substances, promoting clean shipping and mitigating climate change
B. To make the Baltic Sea Region a prosperous place through removing hindrances
to the internal market, exploiting the full potential of the region in research and
innovation and promoting entrepreneurship
C. To make the Baltic Sea Region an accessible and attractive place through
improving transport links, education, tourism and health in the region
D. To make the Baltic Sea a safe and secure place through improving maritime
safety and security and reinforcing protection from major emergencies at sea.
The most important challenge of them is environment and particular attention is given to
the impacts of the excess nutrients leading to eutrophication, but the strategy pays attention also
to the sustainability of transport modes and to other issues, like accessibility and attractiveness of
the Baltic Sea Region.
The work of the European Union in the matters of the Baltic Sea as a multinational region
encourages cooperation among different multilateral cooperation structures and networks in the
Baltic Sea Region, including the Northern Dimension, Council of the Baltic Sea States, Nordic
Council of Ministers, the Helsinki Commission, Visions and Strategies around Baltic Sea
(VASAB), Baltic Sea States Sub regional Cooperation. The European Union is also a mechanism
which clarifies the roles and responsibility of different actors and stakeholders of environmental
policy and international cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region, for example the implementing
stakeholders of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, including National Contact Points
(NCPs), Priority Area Coordinators (PACs), Horizontal Action Leaders (HALs), and Flagship
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Project Leaders (FPLs). In addition, the European Union encourages cooperation between these
structures, stakeholders and the Russian Federation.186
Rikard Bengtsson points out several examples of progress, outcomes and impacts of the
EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, including projects in transport and energy sectors, such as
“Cleanship”, “Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan”, “Baltic Transportation Outlook” and
“BaltAdapt”. According to Bengtsson, the EU Strategy is drawing together several independent
actors and serving as a platform for more effective and coherent policy development in the Baltic
Sea Region.187
According to the Council of the European Union, the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea
Region “constitutes an integrated framework to address common challenges in the macro-region
benefiting from strengthening co-operation between its stakeholders.”188 Also, based on the
Council of the European Union, the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region is contributing to
economic, social and territorial cohesion in the European Union, and accordingly in the Baltic
Sea Region.189
According to Speth and Haas, a number of factors can improve the context which makes
it easier to reach meaningful agreements and more effective environmental protection.190Thus,
the European Union has provided the political context and cooperative environment as a factor
leading to a more effective environmental regime in the Baltic Sea Region. Bengtsson maintains
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that, for example, the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region has in a short time period come to
be perceived as a way in which the European Union and its institutions and Baltic Sea states
relate to each other.191
According to Speth and Haas, another important factor leading to an effective regime is
national capacity, based on financial mechanisms, knowledge and technology.192 Therefore, the
structural funds of the European Union as the primary financial mechanism are also important
contributory factor to political and environmental cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region.193
However, in regard to the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, the construction of the
strategy is also based on close interaction with Russia, Belarus and other non-members of the
European Union.194 This means that the European Union is working not only to strengthen
relations between the countries which belong to the European Union as a Baltic club of EU
member states, but also as a bridge between those countries (involving former parts and
influence sphere of the Soviet Union) and non-EU countries. This may lead to better
environmental governance as in this framework states are more willing to protect the common
sea.
The environmental cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region after the enlargement of the
European Union has been much more coordinated, strengthened, and motivated than before. The
European Union has produced many contributing factors to the cooperation among the Baltic Sea
states as it serves as a basis for cooperation:
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1) The Baltic Sea has become an “inland sea” of an international organization, so this is
the internal problem of this organization to be responsible for the good environmental
status of the sea
2) The goal of the Baltic Sea Region is now to be one of the leading regions in many
issues: as regards maritime safety, security, attractiveness, sustainability, tourism and
exploiting full potential of the region in research, science and innovation195
3) The EU Strategy has contributed to restructuring institutional relations and tasks and
multilateral cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region196
4) The European Union has enhanced the dialogue with Russia in the Baltic Sea Region
as states are not dealing with Russia separately
5) The European Union has built a macro-region around the Baltic Sea which have led
to increased cooperation among states which already had an environmental regime
before (the Helsinki Commission), but which have lacked political will and
coordination during previous times
6) The actions which show states’ mutual will to protect the environment and cooperate
have grown significantly after the enlargement of the European Union in the Baltic
Sea Region
In sum, the environmental governance of the Baltic Sea Region after the enlargement of the
European Union became more coordinated in accordance with the strategies and directives of the
European Union. This refers to the impact of the European Union on the willingness and ability
of Baltic Sea states to protect the environment of a common sea. The effectiveness of the
environmental regime built after the enlargement of the European Union has been based on the
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supportive network of the European Union in the Baltic Sea Region. While the previous
environmental regime, based on the Helsinki Convention, was quite limited especially before
1992 during the Cold War, the environmental governance of the Baltic Sea under the auspices of
the European Union has been much more successful in terms of cooperation.
However, the European Union has increased also economic growth, prosperity and
human impact on the marine environment (car traffic, shipping, agriculture) in the Baltic Sea
Region. On the other hand, the European Union supports clean shipping and new regulations in
maritime policy and agriculture.
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CONCLUSIONS

The current Master’s thesis has focused on the political cooperation and international
environmental governance in the Baltic Sea Region, mainly since 1974 when an environmental
regime, the Helsinki Commission, was formed. The environmental cooperation in the Baltic Sea
Region has been based on the political situation for the time being. In order to analyze the
effectiveness of an environmental regime, it is needed to take into account also the political
situation – are there hostile and limited relationships among states or is there an international
network which encourages different types of cooperation, including international environmental
governance of a sea? On the one hand, the question is about the responsibility of nation-states.
On the other hand, effective protection of marine environment is determined by international
cooperation.
Empirical analysis was composed of three parts. The first part, which focused on the
emergence of an environmental regime in the Baltic Sea Region, posed two issues: how was this
environmental regime influenced by the political situation of the Cold War, and how did the
regime influence the environmental cooperation? Regarding the incentives of states to cooperate
in the climate of the Cold War, a conclusion is that the environmental cooperation was a political
process rather than something caused by Green thoughts. Another conclusion is that limited
environmental cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region during the Cold War was a better option
than no environmental regime at all: the Helsinki Convention of 1974 was a basis for further
environmental cooperation, the revised Helsinki Commission in 1992 and a more effective
environmental regime in the Baltic Sea Region that resulted.

76

The analysis of the environmental regime in the Baltic Sea Region during the 1990s
focused on the role of the new political situation in the international environmental cooperation.
The environmental governance of the Baltic Sea became more effective and the role and work of
the Helsinki Commission expanded and enlarged (to catchment area, etc.).
The last part of the analysis focused on the role of the European Union in building an
environmental regime in the Baltic Sea Region. The situation in the Baltic Sea Region changed
fundamentally after 2004 when Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland – four coastal states of the
Baltic Sea – joined the European Union. A new course was set in the Baltic Sea Region: the
environmental governance became coordinated in accordance with the directives (EU Water
Framework Directive), strategies (EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region) and policies (EU
Maritime Policy) of the European Union. International environmental cooperation reached a new
level according to which also the effectiveness of the environmental regime can be measured. On
the one hand, the European Union produced many contributory factors to the environmental
cooperation of the Baltic Sea. On the other hand, the economic growth, prosperity, pollution and
increased impact of agriculture after the enlargement of the European Union have also had
impacts on the marine environment of the Baltic Sea. The Baltic Sea has not only become an
internal sea of the European Union, it has become also an internal environmental problem of the
European Union.
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